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Introduction 
The United States has “a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.”1 Sometimes this principle means that we afford 
constitutional protection to false or hyperbolic speech.2 It should not be 
surprising that, especially in a time of high political and cultural 
polarization, the debate surrounding COVID-19 has become heated.3 
We might hope that courts and lawyers addressing legal issues arising 
from the pandemic would refrain from overheated rhetoric that could 
undermine the legitimacy of public health programs that seek to combat 
the pandemic, even if that rhetoric enjoys First Amendment protection. 
Alas, in several notable incidents, that hope has been frustrated. 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Adjunct Professor of 
Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. This essay was 
written before the assault on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Sharona 
Hoffman, Peter Poulos, and Raymond Vasvari provided helpful comments 
on earlier versions. The author takes sole responsibility for errors, 
omissions, and other inadequacies. 
1. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
2. This was true in the very case that articulated this principle. Several of 
the statements in the advertisement that gave rise to Commissioner L.B. 
Sullivan’s libel suit against the New York Times were inaccurate, and 
some of the inaccuracies were not trivial. See id. at 258–59; Harry Kalven, 
Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 199–200. 
3. See, e.g., Lisa Rosenbaum, Tribal Truce—How Can We Bridge the 
Partisan Divide and Conquer Covid?, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682 (2020). 
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I. Judicial Rhetoric 
Three opinions illustrate my concern with judges’ language in 
pandemic-related cases. Let’s begin with On Fire Christian Center, Inc. 
v. Fischer,4 in which the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky entered an ex parte temporary restraining order 
preventing the City of Louisville from taking any action to interfere 
with a church’s drive-in Easter Sunday worship service. The court 
issued the order at 2 p.m. on the day before Easter, which Judge Justin 
Walker explained made it impractical to conduct a hearing.5 The case 
had been filed late the day before, on Good Friday afternoon.6 The 
church went to court after the mayor prohibited drive-in religious 
services; he also announced that police officers would hand out 
information about the health risks of drive-in religious services, record 
the license plate numbers of cars that were present, and share this 
information with the health department, which would contact those 
who attended the services to explain the medical risks of such 
activities.7 
Judge Walker emphasized that the city’s position discriminated 
against religious gatherings because it did not cover nonreligious drive-
in and drive-through activities such as liquor stores or parking lots.8 
Some courts have emphasized this aspect of the On Fire decision in 
rejecting challenges to other health restrictions on religious activities.9 
Perhaps another judge would have assessed the evidence of 
discrimination against religion differently.10 Or maybe the same judge 
 
4. 453 F. Supp. 3d 901 (W.D. Ky. 2020). 
5. See id. at 904. 
6. Id. at 909. 
7. Id. at 908–09. 
8. Id. at 910. 
9. See, e.g., Calvary Baptist Church of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d 
273, 283 n.13 (D. Me. 2020), appeal dismissed, 984 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 
2020); Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 998 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 
2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1152 
(D.N.M. 2020). 
10. Compare Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 
66 (2020) (per curiam) (finding that pandemic-related restrictions on 
worship services discriminated against religion), with id. at 80 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (concluding that the restrictions at issue 
treated religious activities “far more favorably than” secular 
activities); compare South Bay Unified Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 
140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of 
application for injunctive relief) (finding no impermissible discrimination 
against religious activities), with id. at 1614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by 
Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., dissenting from denial of application for 
injunctive relief) (finding that restrictions on attendance at places of 
worship did constitute impermissible discrimination). 
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would have come out the other way if time had permitted an adversary 
hearing at which the city could have presented its side of the story. But 
put such conjecture to the side. 
Consider instead the tone of the opinion. Judge Walker began by 
declaring: “On Holy Thursday, an American mayor criminalized the 
communal celebration of Easter.”11 Thereafter he devoted eight 
paragraphs to chronicling the persecution of Christians, notably 
invoking the Pilgrims’ flight from England and the Thirty Years’ War 
as well as the harsh treatment of enslaved people who attended prayer 
meetings, the violence that led members of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints to migrate to Utah, and various forms of anti-
Catholic and anti-Semitic bigotry in the United States.12 
The hyperbolic opening was completely gratuitous. The analogy 
between a mayor’s effort to prevent drive-in religious services during a 
pandemic, however misguided or even legally problematic, bears no 
resemblance to the religious persecution described in those eight 
paragraphs. Worshipers at On Fire Christian Center did not face 
threats to their lives or the prospect of assault, forced conversion, exile, 
or anything remotely like what the Pilgrims and other disfavored 
religious groups mentioned in the opinion faced. Indeed, other courts 
have found that some health orders impermissibly discriminated against 
religious activities without the rhetorical overkill that Judge Walker 
employed.13 
Another example of judicial hyperbole comes from a concurring 
opinion in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm,14 in which the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court invalidated a pandemic emergency order promulgated 
by the state health director because the director did not follow required 
rulemaking procedures and the order exceeded her authority under state 
law.15 In her concurrence, Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley repeatedly 
invoked Korematsu v. United States16 to explain why she believed that 
 
11. On Fire Christian Center, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 905. 
12. Id. at 905–07. The opinion’s only mention of the “racist, anti-Semitic, and 
anti-Catholic” Ku Klux Klan described the late Justice Hugo Black and 
the late Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd as former Klan members 
without explaining why they were relevant to the discussion. See id. at 
906–07. 
13. See, e.g., Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 
2020); Marysville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614–15 
(6th Cir. 2020); Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268, 282–83 (N.D.N.Y. 
2020). 
14. 942 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2020). 
15. Id. at 918. 
16. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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the emergency order could not stand.17 She emphasized that using 
Korematsu enabled courts “to test the limits of government authority, 
to remind the state that urging courts to approve the exercise of 
extraordinary power during times of emergency may lead to 
extraordinary abuses of its citizens.”18 With all respect, this argument 
is even more problematic than the one in On Fire Christian Center. 
The emergency order at issue in the Wisconsin case directed all 
residents to stay at home and all businesses to remain closed, subject 
to agency-approved exceptions, and also forbade most private 
gatherings.19 Whatever the wisdom or legality of the emergency order, 
it applied to everyone in the state. Unlike the situation in Korematsu, 
no one was targeted based on race, religion, national origin, or any other 
invidious characteristic.20 The invocation of Korematsu therefore was 
not only gratuitous but also demeaning to those who were interned 
(with judicial approval) during World War II. Perhaps the only 
consolation is that the reference to Korematsu appeared in a separate 
opinion; the court majority managed to reach its conclusion without 
reference to one of the most widely condemned rulings that the Supreme 
Court has ever made.21 
Finally, there is Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,22 where a divided Supreme 
Court enjoined the enforcement of restrictions on religious services 
because the restrictions were not neutral toward religion and could not 
 
17. Wis. Legislature, 942 N.W.2d at 923 n.6 (R. Bradley, J., 
concurring). Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley should not be confused with 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, who wrote her own dissenting opinion and 
joined all or most of two other dissents. See id. at 941–42 (A. Bradley, J., 
dissenting); id. at 951 (Dallet, J., dissenting); id. at 974 (Hagedorn, J. 
dissenting). 
18. Id. at 923 (R. Bradley, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
19. Id. at 906–07. 
20. Some commentators have invoked Korematsu in discussing the 
coronavirus pandemic, but they have done so only to argue against 
completely insulating pandemic-related health orders from judicial review 
rather than to imply that those orders raise the same concerns as did the 
Japanese internments during World War II. See Lindsay F. Wiley & 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The 
Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 
183 (2020). 
21. One justice joined Justice Bradley’s concurrence. See Wis. Legislature, 
942 N.W.2d (R. Bradley, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Daniel Kelly 
joined her opinion). Neither the majority opinion, the concurring opinion 
of Chief Justice Patience Roggensack (who also wrote the majority 
opinion), nor Justice Kelly’s separate concurring opinion mentioned 
Korematsu. None of the dissenting opinions in this 4–3 ruling mentioned 
Korematsu, either. 
22. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam). 
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survive strict scrutiny.23 Justice Gorsuch went even further. At one 
point he warned that upholding the state’s restrictions amounted to 
“cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic.”24 He went on to 
maintain that “we may not shelter in place when the Constitution is 
under attack.”25 In essence, he wrote: “Even if the Constitution has 
taken a holiday during this pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical.”26 
Justice Gorsuch seriously distorted the issue.27 Nobody claimed that 
the Constitution should be ignored in assessing the validity of pandemic 
restrictions. Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented on prudential grounds 
despite his reservations about the restrictions, had it exactly right: some 
members of the Court “simply view[ed] the matter differently after 
careful study and analysis reflecting their best efforts to fulfill their 
responsibility under the Constitution.”28 It certainly was possible to 
regard the strict limits on attendance at religious services as facially 
discriminatory when other indoor activities that the state treated as 
essential were not subject to the same restrictions. That is how the 
majority opinion and a separate concurrence by Justice Kavanaugh 
approached the case.29 But dissenting Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan disagreed. In doing so, they concluded that the restrictions, 
viewed in light of medical and epidemiological evidence on which the 
 
23. Id. at 67, 69. 
24. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
25. Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
26. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Nor are these the only pungent 
comments in the concurrence. For example, Gorsuch described the state’s 
position as “it may be unsafe to go to church, but it is always fine to pick 
up another bottle of wine, shop for a new bike, or spend the afternoon 
exploring your distal points and meridians,” alluding to secular exceptions 
for liquor stores, bicycle shops, and acupuncture centers. Id. at 69 
(Gorsuch, J. concurring). See also infra note 43. 
27. The Court’s per curiam opinion also contains a problematic statement 
that is analogous to Justice Gorsuch’s statements: “[E]ven in a pandemic, 
the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020). It is problematic 
for the same reasons that Justice Gorsuch’s statements are 
troublesome, see infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text, but it is the 
only such statement in that opinion. This statement should not be 
ignored, even if the overall tenor of the per curiam opinion noticeably 
contrasts with Justice Gorsuch’s acerbic tone. See supra notes 24–26 and 
accompanying text; infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
28. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 75 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
29. See id. at 66 (footnote omitted) (observing that “the regulations cannot 
be viewed as neutral because they single out houses of worship for 
especially harsh treatment”); id. at 73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(concluding that “once a State creates a favored class of businesses, as 
New York has done in this case, the State must justify why houses of 
worship are excluded from that favored class”).  
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district court had relied in upholding them, did not discriminate against 
religious activities.30 They never suggested that the Constitution was 
irrelevant to the case, only that the restrictions had a sufficiently strong 
legal basis that they should not be enjoined before the district court’s 
judgment could be promptly reviewed by the court of appeals.31 
The Walker, Bradley, and Gorsuch opinions exaggerate the 
problems that these judges identified. It is one thing to conclude that 
the Louisville ban on drive-in religious services violates the Free 
Exercise Clause, that the Wisconsin stay-at-home order was not 
properly promulgated, or that New York should not have treated 
religious activities as riskier than other indoor activities that attract 
numerous participants in close quarters. It is quite another to suggest 
that the mayor sought to persecute religious believers, that the state 
health director was arbitrarily or irrationally mistreating state 
residents, or that a governor high-handedly ignored the Constitution 
during a pandemic. The rhetorical excesses could be read to imply that 
government should not have authority to act against COVID-19 in a 
way that might cause social or economic inconvenience.32 That is, to 
 
30. Id. at 76-77 (Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting); 
id. at 79 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 78 (Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
Resolving the debate over whether the New York regulations actually 
discriminated against religion is beyond the scope of this essay, but it 
bears emphasis that this debate turns on whether the religious activities 
at issue were sufficiently similar to secular activities that were not subject 
to the restrictions and how much, if any, weight medical and 
epidemiological evidence should have in making that assessment. In any 
event, New York seems not to have based its restrictions on the risk of 
coronavirus transmission in different settings. See Agudath Israel of Am. 
v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 2020). 
32. Justice Alito’s remarks about the pandemic late last year do not go that 
far but are nonetheless noteworthy. Alito emphasized the emergence of 
“lawmaking by executive fiat rather than legislation” that empowered “an 
elite group of appointed experts.” Aaron Blake, Samuel Alito’s 
Provocative, Unusually Political Speech, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/13/samuel-alitos-
provocative-unusually-political-speech/ [https://perma.cc/V86C-H34U]. 
But COVID-19 restrictions for the most part have been imposed by 
elected governors and mayors, albeit typically based on recommendations 
from health experts, rather than by administrators acting on their own. 
The major exception was in Wisconsin, which involved restrictions 
imposed by the director of the state health department, but in that case 
the court went out of its way to say that the ruling had nothing to do 
with the governor’s authority. Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 
905 (Wis. 2020). And Alito developed his argument about potential 
governmental overreach with reference to a Nevada statute that 
authorizes the governor rather than an expert administrator to act in an 
emergency. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 
2603 (2020) (denying an injunction pending appeal, over Alito’s dissent, in 
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put it mildly, an unusual position for public officials to take in the midst 
of a health emergency. 
II. Lawyers’ Rhetoric 
While some courts have fallen into rhetorical excess, lawyers also 
have framed their challenges to pandemic-related health orders in 
troublesome ways. Two Ohio cases illustrate the problem. 
In one pending action, eight individual plaintiffs have filed suit in 
federal court challenging the constitutionality of Governor Mike 
DeWine’s emergency declaration and all COVID-19 health orders issued 
pursuant to that order. The complaint in Renz v. Ohio33 asserts a 
variety of claims. Among them are due process,34 privacy,35 the Ninth 
Amendment,36 takings,37 and the freedoms of assembly and religion.38 
This document relies on conspiracy theories as the basis for its claims. 
It attacks “intentionally misleading information” disseminated by the 
state and federal governments, asserts that “COVID-19 is roughly as 
dangerous as the seasonal flu,” and adds that the coronavirus is “less 
dangerous than many other infectious diseases that we have not taken 
such drastic steps to stop.”39 These allegations are amplified over about 
20 pages.40 In essence, the plaintiffs seek to litigate the underlying 
science of COVID-19 before a jury.41 
But the lawyers should have recognized the unwisdom of trying to 
persuade a court to resolve a scientific dispute. They did not need to 
immerse themselves in the debate about the proper role of the judiciary 
 
a case involving restrictions on attendance at religious 
services); Blake, supra. In fact, Alito emphasized that the emergency 
statutes “confer enormous executive discretion” and that “[t]he pandemic 
has resulted in previously unimaginable restrictions on individual 
liberty.” Id. (emphasis added). 
33. No. 3:20–cv–1948 (N.D. Ohio filed Sept. 1, 2020). The plaintiffs filed an 
amended complaint on October 13, 2020, that includes all the quotations 
and other substantive points discussed here. Subsequent references will 
cite both the original and the amended complaint. 
34. Compl., ¶¶ 96–103; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 82–89. 
35. Compl., ¶¶ 104–07; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 90–95. 
36. Compl., ¶¶ 108–10; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 96–98. 
37. Compl., ¶¶ 111–12; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 99–101. 
38. Compl., ¶¶ 113–14; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 102–03. 
39. Compl., ¶ 13; Am. Compl., ¶ 13. 
40. See Compl., ¶¶ 15-64; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 15–64. 
41. The complaint demands a jury trial in a courtroom that does not use any 
special pandemic-related safety arrangements, such as masks or physical 
distancing. Compl., ¶¶ 8–9; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 8–9. 
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in such matters.42 Instead, they might have taken heed of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s warning in a COVID-19 case that the judiciary generally 
should avoid second-guessing medical and scientific decisions.43 The full 
Court, in a subsequent pandemic case that rejected restrictions on 
religious services, similarly emphasized that jurists “are not public 
health experts, and [they] should respect the judgment of those with 
special expertise and responsibility in this area.”44 Indeed, more 
conventional legal arguments have some potential for success. Evidence 
for this point comes from a federal district court ruling that struck 
down Pennsylvania’s pandemic-related emergency orders under some of 
the same constitutional theories on which the Renz plaintiffs rely 
without invoking conspiracy theories and fringe scientific claims.45 
 
42. Probably the most famous chapter in that debate occurred in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit nearly half a century 
ago. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en 
banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (advocating that courts focus on agency 
procedures rather than scientific substance in reviewing administrative 
actions relating to technical issues), with id. at 68–69 (Leventhal, J., 
concurring) (advocating that courts engage with the substance but not 
substitute their judgment for that of agency experts on technical 
matters). See also Wendy E. Wagner, Ethyl: Bridging the Science-Law 
Divide, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1293–95 (1996) (explaining the approach 
taken in the majority opinion in Ethyl, which asked: (1) whether the 
regulatory question could be answered based on existing science; (2) 
whether the agency has properly distinguished between disputed and 
undisputed scientific facts; and (3) whether the agency decision is based 
on undisputed scientific facts and the decision fell within the bounds of 
agency discretion afforded by the relevant statute). 
43. South Bay Unified Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–
14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive 
relief). Rather than following this alternative, the lawyers took a not-so-
subtle swipe at the Chief Judge’s warning without citing this 
case. Compl., ¶ 3; Am. Compl., ¶ 3. 
 Justice Gorsuch later dismissed the Chief Justice’s opinion as ”nonbinding 
and expired.” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 
63, 70 (2020) (per curiam) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But the Court’s order 
granting temporary injunctive relief against New York’s restrictions on 
religious services emphasized that those restrictions discriminated against 
religion. Id. at 66. The majority opinion did not question the validity of 
the medical judgments that the state had used to justify its 
restrictions. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
44. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 68.  
45. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883 (W.D. Pa. 2020), stay 
pending appeal granted, No. 20–2936, 2020 WL 5868393 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 
2020). 
 As this essay was going to press, the Renz plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 
their case after the district judge ordered them to submit a coherent 
complaint that presented a “short and plain statement of the claim.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See Jo Ingles, Federal Lawsuit over COVID Closures 
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In the other Ohio case, nine dance studios challenged state closure 
orders. The complaint in State ex rel. Your Next Move LLC v. Graham46 
included two quotations supposedly from Ex parte Milligan.47 That 
landmark case held that the federal government could not prosecute 
Northern critics of the Civil War in military tribunals when the civilian 
courts remained open.48 A party challenging governmental restrictions 
on private actors understandably might find this a helpful precedent. 
But neither statement appears anywhere in Milligan, which covers 141 
pages in Volume 71 of the United States Reports.49 
The first nonexistent quotation, which is repeated three times, says: 
“Neither the legislature nor any executive or judicial officer may 
disregard the provisions of the constitution in case of emergency.”50 
These rhetorically powerful words cannot be found in Milligan. 
Similar language does appear in People ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago,51 
a 1935 Illinois case that struck down a measure that reduced the salaries 
of municipal judges during the Great Depression. That language has 
been quoted in approximately half a dozen other state cases over the 
years, although never in a federal case and certainly not in a Supreme 
Court opinion.52 But the complaint does not refer to Lyle or any of those 
other state cases. 
 
Dropped as Backers Change Legal Strategy, WKSU, Mar. 18, 2021, 
https://www.wksu.org/government-politics/2021-03-18/federal-lawsuit-
over-covid-closures-dropped-as-backers-change-legal-strategy 
[https://perma.cc/X3RQ-RMZ5]; Jake Zuckerman, Judge Blasts COVID-
19 Lawsuit Against Health Department as “Incomprehensible,” OHIO CAP. 
J., Feb. 10, 2021, https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2021/02/10/judge-
blasts-covid-19-lawsuit-against-health-department-as-incomprehensible/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UP9-G867]. 
46. No. 20CV000785 (Lake County, Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. filed June 22, 2020) 
[hereinafter Your Next Move]. 
47. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
48. Id. at 122–27; see also id. at 135–36 (Chase, C.J., joined by Wayne, 
Swayne & Miller, JJ., concurring). 
49. See id. at 2–142. 
50. Your Next Move, Compl., ¶¶ 38, 43, 58. 
51. 195 N.E. 451, 453 (Ill. 1935) (“Neither the Legislature nor any executive 
or judicial officer may disregard the provisions of the Constitution even 
in case of a great emergency.”). 
52. People ex rel. John V. Farwell Co. v. Kelly, 196 N.E. 795, 797 (Ill. 1935) 
(quoting Lyle) (ordering payment of compensation to owner of property 
damaged by change in road grade); Nierstheimer v. State, 9 Ill. Ct. Cl. 
365, 367 (1937) (quoting Farwell, which quoted Lyle) (dismissing on 
statute-of-limitations grounds a claim for damage to property resulting 
from change in highway grade); People ex rel. Northrup v. City Council, 
31 N.E.337, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (not citing Lyle but repeating the 
language) (striking down salary reductions for members of the Chicago 
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The second nonexistent quotation says: 
ANYONE who declares the suspension of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights (to freely travel, peacefully assemble, earning a 
living, freely worship, etc) and or attempts to enforce such 
suspension with the 50 independent, sovereign, continental 
United States of America is making war against our 
constitution(s) and therefore, we the people. They violate their 
constitutional oath and thus, immediately forfeit their office and 
authority and their proclamations may be disregarded with 
impunity and that means ANYONE; even the governor and 
President.53 
This one contains two obvious clues to its falsity. First, there were 
only 36 states in 1866.54 Second, there are not 50 “continental” states 
even today, unless Hawaii suddenly got relocated. The idiosyncratic 
prose style, capitalization, and punctuation might also raise questions 
about the quotation’s authenticity.55 
The dance studio case was voluntarily dismissed only a few weeks 
after the complaint was filed,56 so we do not know whether the 
defendants or the court caught the made-up quotations. But the 
lawyers who represented the studios should have known better than to 
attribute quotations to a landmark case like Milligan without 
confirming that those quotations actually appeared there.57 It would be 
 
Board of Aldermen); Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 663 (Ill. 
2004) (quoting Lyle) (striking down an effort to withhold cost-of-living 
adjustments from state judges); Sherman v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 937 
N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (quoting Lyle) (rejecting challenge 
to a student fee); In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 19 (Ill. 2015) 
(quoting Lyle) (rejecting cutbacks in retirement benefits); Hall v. Elected 
Officials Retirement Plan, 383 P.3d 1107, 1117 (Ariz. 2016) (rejecting 
cutbacks in retirement benefits). For more about Jorgensen, see Jonathan 
L. Entin, Getting What You Pay For: Judicial Compensation and Judicial 
Independence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 25, 30–31. 
53. Your Next Move, Compl., ¶ 80. The idiosyncratic punctuation reproduces 
the complaint; I have not altered anything. 
54. See Admission of States to Union, https://u-s-history.com/pages/
h928.html [https://perma.cc/6DBM-8PGH]. 
55. Another detail suggests that something is amiss with both quotations. 
The complaint does not indicate the specific pages where the quotes can 
be found, although it does provide pinpoint citations for other 
quotations. Compare Your Next Move, Compl., ¶¶ 38, 43, 58, 80 
(containing no pinpoints for alleged Milligan quotations), with id., ¶¶ 82, 
83, 88–89, 93, 97, 100–07, 110, 115–19, 123–25 (providing pinpoints for 
other quotations). 
56. Your Next Move, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (filed July 29, 2020). 
57. Apart from that major problem, the complaint was replete with spelling 
and grammatical errors. To give just one of many possible examples, the 
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devastating to any advocate’s credibility with the court if either the 
other side or the court itself discovered the problem. In addition, relying 
on bogus quotes breaches rules providing that an attorney’s signature 
attests to the accuracy of statements in submissions to the court.58 
As the Wisconsin case and a decision by the Michigan Supreme 
Court59 make clear, there are plausible grounds to challenge the validity 
of pandemic orders without invoking rhetorical overkill or dubious 
quotations. Whether those arguments should succeed is beyond the 
scope of this essay. I am concerned only with the appropriate kind of 
argumentation.60 
III. Another Example 
Before concluding, let me add a few words about some troublesome 
comments by Attorney General William Barr.61 In answer to a question 
about pandemic restrictions after a speech last fall, Barr condemned 
business closures and stay-at-home orders as analogous to slavery. Here 
are his exact words: “[P]utting a national lockdown, stay at home 
orders, is like house arrest. Other than slavery, which was a different 
 
name of defendant Lance Himes, the interim director of the Ohio 
Department of Health, is misspelled every time it appears, including in 
the case caption. But the failure to proofread is the least of the problems 
with the complaint. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
58. In Ohio, a lawyer’s signature on a pleading “constitutes a certificate by 
the attorney [ . . . ] that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge [ . . . ] 
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it.” 
OHIO. R. CIV. P. 11. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (providing that an 
attorney’s signature on a pleading certifies that “the factual contentions 
have evidentiary support”). 
59. In re Certified Questions, No. 161492, 2020 WL 5877599 (Mich. 
2020); see also House of Representatives v. Governor, 949 N.W.2d 276 
(Mich. 2020). 
60. Lawyers have asserted fringe theories and made false factual statements 
in other proceedings, of course. For example, this has occurred in many 
cases challenging the results of the 2020 presidential election. See, 
e.g., John Kruzel, Trump Attorneys Risk Disciplinary Action Over Wave 
of Election Suits, HILL (Dec. 24, 2020), https://thehill.com/regulation/
court-battles/531537-trump-attorneys-risk-disciplinary-action-over-wave-
of-election-suits [https://perma.cc/F6AA-848S]; Steven Lubet, That 
Louie Gohmert Lawsuit, HILL (Jan. 1, 2021), https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/532289-that-louie-gohmert-lawsuit?rnd=1609463513 
[https://perma.cc/B3LV-2C54]. 
61. There is no shortage of inflammatory rhetoric from other public officials, 
but my focus here is on members of the bar who are subject to professional 
norms that apply only to lawyers. 
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kind of restraint, this is the greatest intrusion on civil liberties in 
American history.”62 
These comments, like Justice Bradley’s ill-considered references to 
Korematsu, miss the point.63 They demean the millions of enslaved 
persons who were treated as property because they were regarded as 
less than human. Perhaps some pandemic orders have been unwise or 
legally problematic, but the comparison to slavery is unseemly. Those 
orders are designed to protect public health, not to degrade persons or 
groups as unworthy of membership in civil society. Perhaps the 
comments are not as disturbing as the other examples discussed in this 
essay because they came in response to a question rather than as part 
of a written document. Even if we accept that assumption, the 
comments reflect poorly on Barr’s judgment. Distinguishing slavery as 
merely “a different kind of restraint” suggests a profound lack of 
understanding of the peculiar institution. We should expect the nation’s 
leading law enforcement official to offer a more thoughtful critique of 
governmental responses to COVID-19 than Barr provided. 
Conclusion 
The legal system seeks to offer constructive alternatives to reliance 
on self-help for resolving disputes. In participating in a system that 
serves this vital function, lawyers and judges have important civic 
responsibilities. Among them, those actors should try to structure the 
legal process in a way that reduces the level of anger and aggression in 
society, especially when tensions are running high. We are talking here 
about norms, not rules that can or should be formally enforced. These 
norms apply with particular force to disputes about governmental 
responses to COVID-19, the most serious public health crisis since the 
global influenza pandemic a century ago.64 
 
62. Anna Salvatore, Transcript of Attorney General’s Remarks as Delivered 
and Q&A at Hillsdale College, LAWFARE (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/transcript-attorney-generals-remarks-
delivered-and-qa-hillsdale-college [https://perma.cc/A23R-DAGP]; see 
also Katie Benner, Barr Defends Right to Intrude in Cases as He Sees 
Fit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ZKdrtK 
[https://perma.cc/6LYN-KESJ]; Quint Forgey & Josh Gerstein, Barr 
Creates Firestorm with Comments that Appear to Boost Trump’s 
Reelection Campaign, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/17/william-barr-coronavirus-
lockdowns-slavery-416776 [https://perma.cc/6VK3-YPWC]. 
 Of course, there has not been a “national” lockdown. The restrictions 
imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have been adopted at the state 
or local level. But the problems with Barr’s statements apply regardless 
of what level of government adopted the restrictions. 
63. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text. 
64. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA (2004). 
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Public officials are facing threats to their lives over their efforts to 
combat the coronavirus. Well-respected health experts have been driven 
from their positions,65 while governors and mayors have been targeted 
for kidnapping and murder.66 Some of those efforts might be ineffective  
65. See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Pandemic Backlash Jeopardizes 
Public Health Powers, Leaders, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://khn.org/news/article/pandemic-backlash-jeopardizes-public-
health-powers-leaders/ [https://perma.cc/JHL6-5HNN]; Julie Bosman, 
Health Officials Had to Face a Pandemic. Then Came the Death 
Threats, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3152Cnk
 [https://perma.cc/Z3YS-QGSU]; Rachel Weiner & Ariana Eunjung 
Cha, Amid Threats and Political Pushback, Public Health Officials Are 




66. The FBI arrested a group of conspirators who were planning to kidnap 
the governor of Michigan. See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs et al., F.B.I. 
Says Michigan Anti-Government Group Plotted to Kidnap Gov. Gretchen 
Whitmer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3jILDhg
[https://perma.cc/VF2N-H2TB]; Matt Zapotosky et al., FBI Charges Six 
Who It Says Plotted to Kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, as 
Seven More Who Wanted to Ignite Civil War Face State Charges, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 9, 2020, 2:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/michigan-governor-kidnap-plot/2020/10/08/0032e206-
0980-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z657-
VC5E]. The governor of Virginia might also have been a 
target. See Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio & Neil MacFarquhar, Virginia 
Governor Was Also a Possible Target of Anti-Government Plot, F.B.I. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2IttKW0 
[https://perma.cc/T4YJ-54MM]; Kayla Ruble et al., Whitmer Plotters 
Also Discussed Kidnapping Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam, FBI Agent 




 In addition, police arrested a Wichita, Kansas, man who threatened to 
kidnap and kill the mayor over his pandemic policies. See Timothy 
Bella, Wichita Man Arrested for Threatening to Kidnap and Kill Mayor 
Over City’s Mask Mandate, Police Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/19/wichita-mayor-
kidnapping-threat-masks-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/5YJX-
RFWQ]; Christina Morales & Michael Levenson, Man Arrested After 
Threatening Wichita Mayor Over Face Masks, Police Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2020), https://nyti.ms/358ZnM9 
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZZ-39AZ]. 
 Another Kansas mayor resigned after receiving numerous death threats 
over her city’s adoption of a mask order. See Teo Armus, Kansas Mayor 
Resigns Over Violent Threats for Backing Mask Mandate: “I Do Not Feel 
Safe Anymore,” WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/12/16/kansas-mayor-
mask-covid-resignation/ [https://perma.cc/F9W3-WPN3]; John Eligon, 
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or even unlawful, but judges and lawyers have civic responsibilities to 
maintain an appropriate level of public discourse. The inflammatory 
rhetoric discussed in this essay certainly is protected by the First 
Amendment, because it is not “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action [nor] is [it] likely to incite or produce such 
action.”67 But surely members of the legal profession should aspire to a 
higher standard than that, and the public should expect them to behave 
in a way that does not undercut efforts to combat the coronavirus. It 
should not need to be said, but judges ought to refrain from gratuitous 
or inflammatory statements from the bench and in their written 
opinions, and lawyers ought to frame their arguments without resorting 
to conspiracy theories and nonexistent sources. Unfortunately, some 





After Personal Threats Over a Local Mask Mandate, the Dodge City, 
Kansas, Mayor Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://nyti.ms/2Kdot5Z [https://perma.cc/9WBY-ZCGK]. 
 And the governor of New Hampshire cancelled plans for an outdoor 
inauguration because of credible threats of violence resulting from his 
mask order. Brendan Cole, Republican Governor Cancels Inauguration 




 This is not an exhaustive list of harassment of public officials in 
connection with pandemic policies. See, e.g., Lily Altavena,Paradise 
Valley Unified Superintendent Resigns Amid Calls for Civility in COVID-
19 Debates, AZCENTRAL.COM (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/local/phoenix-education/2020/12/07/paradise-valley-
superintendent-jesse-welsh-resigns-amid-online-vitriol/3861022001/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q3DS-J5XX]; Eligon, supra. 
67. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (footnote 
omitted). 
